National Reporting and Learning System Research and Development by Mayer, E et al.
NRLS Research and Development iii
NRLS  
RESEARCH AND  
DEVELOPMENT
NIHR Patient Safety Translational Research Centre at Imperial 
College London and Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust 
NIHR IMPERIAL PATIENT SAFETY TRANSLATIONAL  
RESEARCH CENTRE
The NIHR Imperial Patient Safety Translational Research Centre 
(PSTRC) is part of the National Institute for Health Research and 
is a collaboration between Imperial College London and Imperial 
College Healthcare NHS Trust. 
The NIHR Imperial PSTRC undertakes research to drive forward 
improvements in patient safety within the NHS. We use our funding 
to deliver sustainable long-term, high impact programmes of 
translational research in patient safety. Our research has the 
potential to translate into real benefits for patients, such as 
reducing prescription errors, improving diagnosis and reducing 
accidents during surgery. 
Our strategy is to develop patient safety in the NHS and 
internationally through engagement with patients, carers, the 
public, clinical partners, healthcare organisations, social care, 
industry and government. We do this by carrying out research in our 
unique areas of academic strength in safety information, design and 
technology, patient engagement, teamwork, economics and policy. 
www.imperial.ac.uk/patient-safety-translational-research-centre
Funded by NHS England. 
The views expressed in this report are those of the participants 
and the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of NHS 
England, the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health.
NATIONAL REPORTING 
AND LEARNING 
SYSTEM  
RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT
NRLS Research Team
Chief Investigator: Ara Darzi 
Theme 1 – Purpose of incident reporting
Clinical Lead: Erik Mayer
Academic Lead: Nick Sevdalis
Researchers: Stephanie Archer, Jonathan Benn,  
Ann-Marie Howell, Louise Hull, Iliatha Papachristou
Theme 2 – User experience with reporting systems
Clinical Lead: Paul Ziprin
Academic Lead: Dominic King
Researchers: Victor Lesk, Mohammad Mobasheri
 
 
 
 
Theme 3 – Data quality and analysis
Clinical Lead: Elaine Burns
Academic Lead: Thanos Athanasiou
Researchers: Adam Bernard, George Bouras,  
Ann-Marie Howell, Christopher Pettengell
Theme 4 – Effective feedback for learning
Clinical Lead: Mark Sacks
Academic Lead: Jonathan Benn
Researchers: Jonathan Benn, Salmaan Mohammed, 
Marcos Manhaes, Danielle D’Lima, Iliatha Papachristou, 
David Magee
Funding and Acknowledgements 
The NRLS research team would like to extend their 
particular thanks to Mike Durkin, Jit Patel and Lucie 
Mussett for their continued support on this project. We 
are also grateful for NHS England’s funding to enable this 
programme of research.
We gratefully acknowledge the following for their con-
tributions to the research and development programme 
and this report (in alphabetical order):
• Janet Bewell (Akendi)
• Dalton Coker (BDAU, Imperial College London
• Simon Heys (Make and Ship)
• Leo Poll (Akendi)
• Joshua Symons (BDAU, Imperial College London)
• Mark Thomsit (Make and Ship)
• The NRLS analysts at Imperial College Healthcare 
NHS Trust
Report Authors
Erik Mayer, Kelsey Flott, Ryan Callahan, Ara Darzi
NRLS Research and Development 3
CONTENTS
Foreword  4
Executive summary  5
Domain overviews  6
CHAPTER ONE
NRLS state of play  9
CHAPTER TWO
Research programme findings  13
CHAPTER THREE
Patient safety intelligence in the future  20
CHAPTER FOUR
Demonstrating feasibility through prototyping  23
CHAPTER FIVE
Assessing usage and impact through evaluation 26
Summary list of recommendations for NHS Improvement 28
References 29
4 NRLS Research and Development
FOREWORD
Measuring what happens to patients during their care is the first step 
towards improving health services. It is especially important in patient 
safety, as it provides insight about when patients are most vulnerable, and 
where new safeguards are most needed. The NHS has multiple conduits 
through which patient safety information can reach providers, policy makers 
and the public. The most established and extensively used is the National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). 
The NRLS was instituted in 2003, just two years after To Err is Human 
instigated a global movement towards patient safety. It collects incident 
reports from frontline staff and aims to enhance accountability, patient 
safety culture and shared learning. The NRLS has helped raise the profile 
of patient safety and promoted the fundamentals of measurement as a 
mechanism for improvement. Fifteen years on, however, it is time to evaluate 
its impact and explore options for its future direction. 
With expert leadership and support from Mike Durkin and his team at NHS 
England, we at the Institute of Global Health Innovation, Imperial College 
London have devoted three years to that endeavour. We would like to thank 
Liam Donaldson for spending the three years with us on this programme.
Our research has evaluated the NRLS’s conceptual premise, the user experi-
ence with reporting and mechanisms to enhance the culture of reporting and the 
all important feedback to improve shared learning. The aim of this work was not 
simply to evaluate, but to stimulate innovation around the NRLS. Researchers 
analysed NRLS data in novel ways and devised creative strategies for breaking 
down the most entrenched challenges facing incident reporting systems.
The result of this work is a blueprint for NRLS progress with two central pillars: 
• Integrating design principles and the use of behavioural insights to renovate 
the reporting platform such that it facilitates uptake and data utilisation
• Differentiating between the goals of reporting and learning, and the 
various tools they require at the local and national level
The future of the NRLS is rich in possibilities, and this report details the 
evidence base and technologies behind them. It details how we build a 
reporting platform to support shared learning, and an overarching system to 
enhance it. We must maintain a firm commitment to the principles of patient 
safety measurement, supporting a culture of transparency and openness 
when things go wrong and minimising avoidable harm in order to protect the 
patients we care for.
Ara Darzi
Professor the Lord Darzi of Denham
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the findings of the NRLS Research 
and Development Programme conducted by the 
Patient Safety Translational Research Centre (PSTRC) 
and the Centre for Health Policy (CHP) at Imperial 
College London. 
It sets out the current state of affairs regarding 
patient safety incident reporting in the NHS, and 
specifies where the most pressing areas of concerns are, 
including thorough descriptions of the various incident 
reporting systems used in the NHS today. Furthermore it 
identifies areas for improvement in the overall landscape 
of incident reporting, and suggests how systems like the 
NRLS can capitalise on developments in technology. 
The main body of the report is then devoted to 
explaining the findings from the research programme. The 
research was divided into four domains, and the report 
details the new findings discovered about each of them: 
1. Purpose of incident reporting in healthcare 
2. User experience with reporting systems 
3. Data quality and analysis 
4. Effective feedback for learning
Building on these findings, the report moves on to de-
scribe how they can be applied to the next generation of 
incident reporting. Specifically, it focuses on a prototype 
for a new incident reporting system that incorporates the 
improvement ideas generated by the research. 
Finally, the report concludes with a description of 
an evidence-based framework for evaluating incident 
reporting systems and an ‘Achievement Toolkit’ of 
ten recommendations for improvements to incident 
reporting systems. 
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DOMAIN 1
Purpose of  
incident reporting
• Explore reporting aims, practices 
and functions 
• Explore and define user requirements 
for the NRLS
• Specification of attributes and elements 
of a reporting system for the future
DOMAIN 2
User experience 
with reporting 
systems
• Review and usability testing of the 
current NRLS online reporting platform 
• Development of an information 
architecture that supports the aims 
and objectives of the NRLS
• Design and development of an enhanced 
NRLS online platform
• Usability testing and evaluation of 
enhanced NRLS online platform
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DOMAIN 4
Effective feedback 
for learning
• Scoping review to establish evidence 
base for effective feedback from incident 
reporting
• Retrospective evaluation of the impact of 
feedback upon reporting rates
• Investigation of social media in health as a 
technology for feedback and learning
• Develop a research-based model for 
effective feedback from national reporting
DOMAIN 3
Data quality 
and analysis
• Assess the validity of the current NRLS 
system to classify patient safety incidents
• Investigate the potential to automate and 
enhance the free text analysis of reported 
patient safety incidents including the 
development of an improved classification 
of patient safety incidents
• Systematic review of incidents that impact 
on patient quality of life
• Measure incidents that are important 
to patients from multiple routine and 
non-routine national databases
• Comparison of incident reporting 
to measurable incidents at 
organisational level
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IMPORTANCE OF THIS WORK TO THE NHS
The health service’s commitment to patient safety is the 
strongest it has ever been. In the last five years, several 
important milestones have elevated this agenda to the 
highest urgency and priority.
• In the NHS Constitution, patients are given the 
‘right’ to expect a standard of safe care and “to 
expect NHS bodies to monitor, and make efforts 
to improve continuously, the quality of healthcare 
they commission or provide,” including safety.1
• In the latest major strategic document from NHS 
England, the Five Year Forward View, the first set 
of ambitions stated are to improve healthcare 
quality and reduce variation in the safety of care. 
It says, “as national bodies we can do more by 
measuring what matters, requiring comprehensive 
transparency of performance data.”2
• The recent high-profile expert reviews from Bruce 
Keogh,3 Robert Francis,4 and Don Berwick5 have 
lent profile and weight to an agenda which histori-
cally lacked visibility and priority.
• Organisationally, NHS Improvement now con-
solidates the responsibilities for improving the 
safety of care across NHS England’s patient safety 
directorate, the Trust Development Authority, 
and Monitor.
• The introduction of a statutory duty of candour 
into the professional responsibilities of frontline 
staff signals a turn away from secretive and 
self-protective attitudes that have characterised 
responses to patient safety incidents in the past.
At the same time, however, the NHS’s tools for 
assuring the quality of care and measuring progress 
against the aspirations outlined above are inadequate 
to the importance of the challenge. Of particular concern 
are the information systems which are meant to gather 
actionable accounts of instances of unsafe care.
Too often, the data are missing, or the data that 
is gathered does not consistently inform and inspire 
change. Duplication of effort and confusion about the 
purpose of reporting into these systems is common-
place. We cannot say with confidence how many patients 
are harmed in NHS care, although some estimates 
suggest that around 3.6% of all deaths in hospitals 
are avoidable.6 Because patient safety issues are 
dangerously under-reported, it is likely that these figures 
are underestimates, meaning our energies would be best 
placed to make care safer.
If the NHS is to cement its commitment to patient 
safety in the information age, it must begin with an 
honest account of its challenges, and put in place a 
reliable mechanism for monitoring progress against the 
goals that have been outlined above and echoed across 
the health service.
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CHAPTER ONE
NRLS STATE 
OF PLAY
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Patient safety information systems in the 
NHS today
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS)
The idea that better information could lead to safer care 
is not new. In 2001, policymakers created the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), which subsequently set 
up the NRLS in 2003, the first of its kind to be modelled 
after the example set in other, safety-critical industries 
like aviation and nuclear power.
 Box 1: Key features of the NRLS
• A voluntary system for NHS staff to report safety incidents 
and near-misses
• Collects data mainly through local risk management 
systems in hospitals
• Reporters are usually identifiable at the local level, and 
always anonymised at the national level
• Reports composed of a combination of structured data 
fields and free text narrative 
• Risk managers at hospitals report into a central database 
hosted by Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust on behalf 
of NHS England
• Reports form the basis of Patient Safety Alerts and advice 
from NHS England (formerly from the NPSA)
The NRLS has collected over 10 million incident reports 
since its inception, making it in all likelihood the largest 
patient safety-focused database in the world. On average, 
a new NRLS report is created once every 35 seconds. 
What has happened as a result of these reports? The 
majority of incidents are reported locally via risk man-
agement systems, providing the opportunity for local use 
before submission to the NRLS. From the NRLS, a number 
of Patient Safety Alerts7 have been generated providing 
a national view to inform local practice and a resource 
to local hospitals to better understand the safety of care 
they deliver, in some places more than others. 
The premise of the NRLS was correct by casting the 
net shallow and wide to encourage and support report-
ing. As a result of its own success, however, we capture 
a large volume of high frequency, low intensity incidents 
relative to the low frequency, high intensity incidents. 
This has led to external criticism such as:
“It is a significant criticism of the NRLS that its 
approach to data collection is ‘wide and shallow’, 
whereas it should be ‘narrow and deep’. The latter 
approach would entail focusing on gathering in-
depth analysis of reported incidents that are less 
common in type and more serious in the degree of 
actual or potential harm associated with them.” 
(Commons Select Committee on Health, 2009)
Also, the Francis Inquiry Report in response to the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust scandal noted that:
“The NRLS is not yet producing high quality, 
actionable information on the patterns, trends, 
and underlying causes of harm to patients.”
The NRLS is an information system which has 
collected a vast quantity of reports about patient safety 
incidents in the NHS, by virtue of the efforts of frontline 
staff. The quality and utility of that information, however, 
has not achieved its intended potential; the goal of 
collective learning has not been fully realised.
A series of other incident reporting systems exist 
across the NHS. On one hand these augment the infor-
mation about patent safety that is available nationally, 
but on the other hand, they compound the complexity 
of the data landscape and increase the effort staff must 
devote to incident reporting. These include: 
Strategic Executive Information System (StEIS)
Unlike the NRLS, which is open to NHS frontline staff, 
access to StEIS is restricted to operational managers and 
executives in the health service, who use the system to 
record serious incidents, especially but not exclusively 
‘never events’.8 There are 25 ‘never events’, of which 
three account for the vast majority of reported incidents: 
retained foreign object post procedure, wrong site surgery, 
and wrong implant/prosthesis. StEIS reporting procedures 
vary by locality, having previously been administered 
through individual Strategic Health Authorities in the 
previous NHS management structure, but generally consist 
of a manual process which alerts relevant stakeholders 
that an event has occurred, triggering an investigation.
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Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) Yellow Card and medical device reporting
Drugs and medical devices can present a unique chal-
lenge for patient safety because they often change – new 
technologies are introduced which are unfamiliar to 
staff, may interact adversely with other technologies, 
or may be defective. The regulatory agency responsible 
for these technologies, the MHRA, has established 
reporting systems which enable pharmacists and other 
frontline staff to report patient safety incidents of this 
type directly to a central database.
Care Quality Commission (CQC) notification database 
All registered health services must also notify the CQC 
when adverse incidents occur. This can be done through 
the NRLS, however certain things like deaths, unau-
thorised absences of people who are detained under 
the Mental Health Act 1983, abuse and other extreme 
incidents that may impair the service from operating 
safely need to be reported separately. 
Public Health England notifications 
NHS services are also obliged to report all confirmed 
or suspected cases of infectious diseases to their local 
authority or local health protection team. This is then 
submitted to Public Health England, which analyses and 
publishes the reported trends. These can be reported 
by phone, letter, email or fax but must be securely 
transferred to the dedicated team. 
NHS Safety Thermometer 
Whilst the NHS Safety Thermometer is typically 
thought of as a use of safety reports for quality improve-
ment, it is also an important example of yet another 
reporting outlet for staff to navigate. The NHS Safety 
Thermometer is a ‘Point of Care’ survey in which staff 
can track the amount of harm patients on their ward or 
within their service face in near real time. Staff report 
into it by answering a variety of survey questions about 
the occurrence of harm during a particular shift, and 
that data contributes to a temperature check on safety. 
The thermometer data can be used in conjunction with a 
variety of other data to monitor the state of safety. 
Serious Adverse Blood Reactions & Events (SABRE) 
In addition to the general incident reporting systems, 
there are also reporting systems that capture informa-
tion about a certain category of incidents. For instance, 
SABRE, operated by the MHRA, is a mechanism for 
reporting adverse incidents specifically related to blood 
events. It provides an online platform for users to submit 
blood incidents and reactions to them. 
Serious Hazards of Transfusion Scheme (SHOT) 
This is a voluntary scheme also related to adverse 
blood events. However, use of this reporting scheme 
is highly encouraged by the Chief Medical Officer and 
researchers who require continuity of data year on year 
to make evidence-based recommendations. Reporting 
to this system can also be completed through SABRE to 
reduce duplication of effort, but data is received by SHOT 
independently of the MHRA. 
Local complaints departments and patient stories 
In addition to the many reporting systems in place across 
NHS organisations, there are also collections of patient 
perspectives on safety through local complaints depart-
ments, free text comments on patient surveys and other 
online outlets like Patient Opinion. Aside from local 
complaints, it is unclear how services should reply to or 
act upon incidents that first emerge from these sources. 
Often these reports remain in the general repository of 
patient safety information with little guidance on how 
they should be handled. 
The future of patient safety information 
systems in the NHS
The current patchwork of information systems does not 
adequately meet the needs of the NHS. The amount of 
disparate reporting systems, and the overlap between 
them, causes confusion about how and what to report. 
Senior leaders in the NHS are committed to making 
significant improvements to the current systems and 
reducing duplication of reporting where appropriate. 
However, at the moment the systems and the data 
contained within them are highly inaccessible, making 
it difficult to identify how to improve the systems or 
how to use their data more effectively. Subsequently, 
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the systems themselves remain isolated, and they are 
inhibited in their ability to drive safer care. 
A variety of new technologies, and an influx of emerging 
behavioural insights, are now available to modernise 
existing systems and design novel approaches to incident 
reporting. Firstly, technology has moved on considerably 
since the original design of the NRLS and there are many 
new reporting capabilities, which simply would not have 
been possible in 2003. For instance, communication 
between reporting systems and other healthcare record 
keeping is now much more attainable. This is referred 
to as the interoperability of systems. Interoperability 
has been substantially enhanced by the availability of 
things like cloud computing, which can store and process 
vast amounts of information from different sources and 
locations online. Given these capabilities, it has become 
increasingly possible to centralise reporting for all types of 
problems, meaning blood events could be reported using 
the same process and platform as other incidents. Data 
could be collected centrally, but directed to the relevant 
agency or regulator depending on the nature of the incident. 
Beyond technology, the NHS is now in the position to 
adopt suggestions from the field of behavioural insights, 
such as human-centred design of reporting platforms. 
Behavioural insights help us understand the gap between 
staff’s intended behaviours around incident reporting 
and their actual ones. Human-centred design helps create 
interventions to bridge this gap. Inviting staff to the 
reporting process requires not only a simplification of the 
systems, but a shift in how they are designed – meeting 
the needs of staff and encouraging uptake is a crucial 
means to ensuring systems work. (Options for how to 
achieve this are discussed in Chapter 4: Demonstrating 
Feasibility Through Prototyping.)
Aside from leveraging the new technology and behav-
ioural insights, improving the effectiveness of reporting 
systems heavily revolves around how they are structured 
and how their purpose is conceptualised. There is the 
opportunity to depart from the current structure of the 
NRLS and direct incident data about frequently occurring 
incidents towards local improvement bodies, and send 
more critical, in depth data to national databases for 
further investigation. Staff would only have to report 
once, but the mandatory data about serious and rare 
adverse incidents would be funneled to the national 
dataset. The more basic incidents, some of which may 
not be mandatory, but still very relevant to individual 
providers, can be funneled to local risk managers. This 
structure has the ability to engage staff, as they will 
know their report is going to a relevant risk manager, and 
engage risk managers, especially national ones who will 
not be overwhelmed by surface level data. 
The discussion of incident reporting 
improvement is not unique to the UK and 
there is ample opportunity to learn from 
other countries’ experience
These technologies and ideas represent exciting 
prospects for the NHS to match the pace of development in 
information systems generally. There are also hard choices 
to be made: strategic choices and trade-offs among 
potential options. As the new body NHS Improvement 
considers its options and builds support in the NHS and 
government for this next phase of development, we believe 
the academic evidence base we have been building for the 
last three years suggests a clear course of action.
Finally, the discussion of incident reporting improvement 
is not unique to the UK and there is ample opportunity to 
learn from other countries’ experience. In a study conducted 
by the Leading Health Systems Network at Imperial College 
London, health systems from seven different countries, 
including the UK, reported the details of their protocols for 
incident reporting as well as their use and effectiveness. 
While there were standard features across all systems, 
like the ability for staff to report incidents experienced on 
the ward, other countries used other unique techniques to 
enhance the richness of data procured by their systems. For 
instance Counties Manukau Health (CMH) in New Zealand 
used a patient survey asking patients whether they felt 
safe during their care. Embedding the patient voice in 
understanding patient safety is increasingly important, but 
has not been achieved to the same degree by the NRLS. 
Furthermore, the incident reporting system used in one 
hospital chain in India included specific metrics for staff-re-
ported perceptions of patient safety culture. Considering 
the dynamic link between culture and the effectiveness of 
reporting systems, this is an ideal opportunity to understand 
how we integrate these useful sources of safety information 
from across the NHS into a unified, revised NRLS.9
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CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH 
PROGRAMME 
FINDINGS
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Findings from research and development 
programme
The Centre for Health Policy at Imperial College London 
undertook a detailed study of the NRLS from 2013–2015, 
commissioned by NHS England to assess the NRLS and 
identify priority areas for improvement. The work focused 
on filling existing gaps in the evidence base surrounding 
the NRLS and its impact. This included research in four 
domains: (1) the purpose of incident reporting; (2) user 
experience with reporting systems; (3) data quality 
and analysis; and (4) effective feedback for learning. 
Given the scope of the inquiry, we necessarily came to 
conclusions relevant not only to the NRLS, but patient 
safety information systems more generally.
Domain 1: The purpose of incident reporting 
in healthcare
We sought to understand, by consulting international 
experts and interrogating the body of published literature 
on this topic, what incident reporting can be reasonably 
expected to deliver in the service of patient safety. 
Through a process of consensus building known as a 
Delphi study, we asked an expert group to consider 
various hypotheses about how incident reporting systems 
should work. Experts agreed that incident reporting had a 
strong function to play in local monitoring and evaluation, 
but that they should not be used as epidemiological tools 
to appraise the rate of harm nationally. Rather, at the na-
tional level they are best suited to capturing more serious 
incidents requiring national-level policy decisions. These 
include incidents like medication error, device failures, 
hospital-acquired infections and never events.10
These findings from the Delphi study generated lines 
of inquiry to explore in our literature review; for instance, 
we looked into information about the proper role incident 
reporting systems ought to play in a healthcare system.
Through this work, we learned that there are two basic 
roles that incident reporting systems can play: either a 
learning role, or a reporting role. At a fundamental level, 
these two ends require different means. Systems need to be 
explicit about their goals towards either learning or reporting 
and exactly how they will facilitate those goals. Box 2 
demonstrates some of the typical roles of reporting versus 
learning systems as a map for developing either. 
 Box 2: Characteristics of learning and reporting 
systems
Reporting systems:
• Require mandatory reporting of a standard set of events
• Enable quantifiable, epidemiological analysis
• Provide a means of accountability and a basis for 
investigation
Learning systems:
• Invite voluntary reporting of any event the reporter 
believes is of interest
• Enable the discovery of new types of events and 
qualitative analysis
• Provide a means to generate and disseminate 
interesting insights
At present, the NRLS is seen (as in its name) as both 
a reporting and learning system. There is therefore 
considerable confusion among frontline staff over, for 
example, what ought to be reported and what action ought 
to result – confusion which stems from these two conflated 
roles. The voluntary nature of reporting and anonymity 
guaranteed at the national level preclude the NRLS from 
serving as a meaningful reporting system.11 Yet the learning 
role also goes unfulfilled because of the overwhelming 
volume of reports which do not lead to meaningful 
feedback to reporters. We believe scale is at the core of this 
issue, and recommend a new approach which provides for 
a learning system at a local level and a reporting system at 
the national level.
Domain 2: User experience with reporting 
systems
We sought to understand what it is like to report into the 
NRLS as a frontline staff member in the NHS. While it 
is worth noting that there is for the most part no single 
‘NRLS’ interface common to all frontline staff, we were 
able to draw out common themes from their experience 
and also draw on published literature about barriers and 
facilitators for using incident reporting systems.
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EXHIBIT 1: Barriers and facilitators to incident reporting11
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User experience survey
We worked with user experience experts to survey staff 
on the context in which they make reports, the relative 
ease or difficulty in doing so, and their overall attitude 
toward incident reporting. In general, there are three 
users who support incident reporting as being ‘useful’ 
for every one that does not. However, there are signifi-
cant difficulties experienced by both groups and 47% of 
respondents agreed that there is significant repetition 
of incidents which happen frequently, such as problems 
with discharge letters, falls, or medication errors. 
Furthermore, approximately half of respondents replied 
that they had trouble categorising the type or severity 
of the incident. This indicated that attention should be 
given to the taxonomy of incidents offered by the NRLS 
reporting platform in order to alleviate staff confusion. 
Taken in sum, these challenges reflect a workforce that is 
‘putting up with’ incident reporting, rather than valuing it 
as a resource. 
From hospital to hospital, one will find 
a significant degree of variation in the 
barriers and motivators present
Barriers and facilitators
We learned through interviews and surveys with frontline 
staff that there are a variety of barriers and facilitators 
that ought to be considered in any new approach. While 
the catalogue of potential motivating or discouraging 
factors (see Exhibit 1) helps to illustrate the psychological 
influences playing on reporters, there is a larger context 
to this work which we would also highlight. From hospital 
to hospital, one will find a significant degree of variation 
in the barriers and motivators present, which are 
largely a function of the safety culture which pervades 
the institution. 
Heuristic evaluation of reporting platforms
We have learned that when frontline staff have decided 
to make a report, there are significant frustrations 
involved in the mechanics of submitting a report. 
We undertook a heuristic evaluation of the most 
widely used interface for reporting (through a commonly 
implemented local risk management system) as well as 
the NRLS ‘eForm’ which allows staff to submit directly to 
a central database via the internet. In both cases, there 
were critical flaws identified which, in the view of user 
experience experts, detract from the usefulness of the 
tool and could prevent its proper functioning. These are 
sometimes issues of poor design, but are also a result of 
the long lifespan of the original NRLS system, which has 
had to be updated to reflect changing priorities for data 
collection, and also the desire to allow local organisa-
tions to collect data using whatever system they prefer.
Domain 3: Data quality and analysis
Understanding and interrogating the current dataset
We used advanced computational techniques to examine 
the contents of the NRLS database and the reports 
contained within. At the first level of analysis, we 
wanted to understand the structure and completeness 
of the data. For example, we found that in practice 
the non-mandatory structured data fields are rarely 
completed, while the mandatory free text box provides 
the majority of the usable information in the database. 
These free text entries, ranging from single-word submis-
sions (e.g., ‘fall’) to, at most, over 800-word narratives 
of the incident, are often written in medical shorthand 
and vary considerably across reporters. Furthermore, 
they often included spelling inconsistencies that com-
promised the ability to derive findings about frequently 
occurring words and what they are associated with.
Although free text comments can be difficult to 
analyse, their potential to improve the value of existing 
reports and help generate a better system for catego-
rising incidents in the future is significant. Many free 
text descriptions in the existing NRLS dataset include 
details about the incident, providing important insight 
into how it could be classified. We proceeded to apply 
natural language processing techniques to the free 
text fields and were able to build a classifier algorithm 
that could pick out instances of harm from the terms 
contained within the free text. In practice, this could be 
helpful in removing some of the subjectivity involved 
in classifying events, and accurately flagging the most 
concerning cases for the attention of risk managers. Our 
computer programme was able to pick out cases of harm 
with 85% accuracy having been ‘trained’ by clinicians to 
distinguish between cases of true harm or otherwise.
EXHIBIT 2: clostridium difficile is spelled 371 different ways in NRLS reports
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clostridium difficile
is spelled 371 different ways 
in NRLS reports
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Testing the NRLS data against other sources
We have learned that the current dataset is not neces-
sarily reflective of other measures of hospital quality and 
safety.13 By correlating quantitative metrics taken from 
the dataset (such as reporting rates, or number of reports 
per hospital bed capacity) with other metrics (such as 
standardised hospital mortality rates, NHS Litigation 
Authority claims, or CQC rating) we can test the validity 
of the database. In other words, we asked the question, 
“What does the NRLS tell us about hospitals which we 
think are more or less safe based on other datasets?”
We found that, bar one exception, there was no 
statistically significant correlation between reporting 
rates and any other measures of hospital quality and 
safety. The one exception was reporting culture, as 
described in the NHS Staff Survey. It should be no 
surprise that hospitals where a positive reporting culture 
(respondents agreeing with the statement “I am encour-
aged to report patient safety incidents”) prevails would 
have more reporting. This does not, however, necessarily 
mean that these hospitals are any safer.
Capitalising on opportunity in primary care
We have learned that less than 1% of NRLS reports 
originate in primary care. This impacts patient safety 
across care settings, as secondary care staff have little 
information about incidents in prior interactions with 
the health service, meaning the sector-wide visibility of 
where and to what extent patients experience incidents 
remains blurry. A focus group and small-scale survey of 
GPs showed significant interest in better understanding 
patient safety issues in primary care. Of particular interest 
are the transfers of care to and from the acute setting, 
where lack of coordination and information can contrib-
ute to unsafe care. Incident reporting could prove useful 
in monitoring these interfaces.
Need to obtain better intelligence about incidents
We also sought to understand the potential impact of 
an improved database of patient safety incidents in 
improving the standard of patient care. To do this, we 
focused on specific clinical situations where patient 
safety incidents would be documented in the course of 
clinical care through electronic medical record systems. 
A research database, the Clinical Practice Research 
Datalink (CPRD) aggregates these clinical records. We 
can see clearly in this database that harm continues 
despite advancements in the standard of clinical care, 
and also that a better quantified understanding of this 
harm can provide valuable intelligence to clinicians and 
health system leaders to make needed improvements.14,15
In order to obtain better intelligence from these 
events it will also be important to develop learning 
platforms that are separate from incident reporting. 
These could be dashboards constructed through 
advanced analytics demonstrating the rate and causes 
of certain incidents. Ideally these dashboards could 
also enable communities of stakeholders, experts 
and interested parties to discuss the results; people 
could engage with forums about certain types of 
incidents, possible preventative measures and even 
personal stories about handling difficult incidents. To 
complete the circle of learning for quality improvement, 
it will also be important to explore options for linking 
incident data to other sources of quality information like 
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) or the National Patient 
Survey Programme. 
Domain 4: Effective feedback for learning
We have learned that another crucial step to learn from 
incident reporting is about ‘closing the loop’ between 
reporting and feedback for learning. We know from 
existing studies that outputs from incident reporting 
systems can serve as encouragement, or a wake-up call, 
helping to change both specific clinical practices and the 
overall safety culture of a hospital. However, a survey 
we commissioned showed that clinicians do not access 
one of the principal forms of feedback available from the 
NRLS today: making institutional data available through 
the data feedback system. Although risk managers are 
able to view the data, it is not clear that clinical staff, 
who are doing the majority of the reporting, benefit from 
even this limited form of feedback.
We also know that effective feedback, across incident 
reporting systems in multiple industries, tends to have 
eight essential components:16
1. Includes visible sponsorship from local leadership
2. Preserves anonymity without compromising learning
3. Rewards reporters and reinforces reporting
4. Supports prioritisation of resources for improvement
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5. Involves and engages frontline staff in the safety 
improvement process
6. Tailored to be specific and relevant to its audience
7. Occurs at multiple points in the alerting and response 
process
8. Facilitates dialogue between relevant stakeholders.
Feedback cannot just be a passive dissemination 
of information if it is to become a meaningful portion 
of the overall improvement project. It is instead better 
understood as an active process of communication 
which sustains a continuous cycle of learning, reporting, 
and learning. Feedback also plays a role in establishing 
accountability, as staff are more likely to report incidents 
when they are certain that it will be reviewed and 
acted upon.  
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CHAPTER THREE
PATIENT SAFETY 
INTELLIGENCE 
IN THE FUTURE
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The research findings from each of the four areas under 
consideration have provided a useful blueprint for 
designing a new NRLS. The first step is differentiating 
local learning systems from national reporting systems. 
At a national level, creating a working incident reporting 
system is an end in itself, but in local systems, it can 
also be a means to supporting a relevant learning 
system. We therefore see it as important to focus on 
solidifying the foundation behind the reporting function 
at both levels. We fully accept that learning starts 
with reporting, and the use of those reports, but to 
many frontline staff the notion of ‘reporting’ denotes 
a regulatory purpose without reflection.
Our research has demonstrated that NRLS’s utility as 
an effective reporting system at either level is currently 
compromised by a variety of problems within the structure 
of the reporting platform as well as the culture that 
surrounds reporting in general. Renovating the NRLS will 
require rectifying these internal problems and designing 
new mechanisms within the systems to mitigate the impact 
of the external problems. There can be little doubt that this 
approach will challenge the traditional concept of incident 
reporting in the NHS, which has been oriented more toward 
learning in several important ways: anonymity, open-ended 
reporting for any incident of concern, and reporting 
infrastructure intermediated by local risk management 
systems. What we propose largely moves away from these 
expectations at the national level. The payoff for this new 
approach, however, is potentially enormous.
Features of a new system will include user-friendly 
interfaces, effective incident classification systems 
and leveraging new technologies for better platforms, 
feedback and analytics. In constructing a picture of 
the future NRLS, we have been mindful of the need to 
promote a culture conducive to the system’s success. 
Engendering cultural change will require a whole-system 
approach and a sector-wide commitment to safety.17 
From our perspective this requires making sure new 
ideas for reporting systems are supported by reporters 
and risk managers, clearly delineating staff roles and 
responsibilities and ensuring effective feedback loops.
Locally-led, data-driven service improvement 
We conclude that local organisations should continue 
to collect, assess and respond to common patient 
safety incidents which are processed through local 
risk management systems. Not only do these systems 
serve a valuable management purpose by providing 
a risk register and record of management actions, but 
they are ingrained in the workflows and expectations 
of NHS staff. 
It is important to apply the principles of 
best practice to these systems in order to 
facilitate reporting
As described before, one of the most consistent 
findings in our research was that the NRLS casts a wide 
and shallow net to capture a lot of incidents without 
extensive detail. This type of monitoring plays a more 
important role at the local level than the national level. 
For instance, an exact log of how many patient falls 
were reported in a single day and where they occurred 
would support the risk manager in targeting resources 
towards areas with a high volume of fall reports. This 
information could be invaluable for designing locally 
relevant improvement strategy, but is not particularly 
useful outside that context other than to contribute to an 
aggregate number of falls. Whereas at the national level, 
it is more important to have detailed information on rare 
and serious incidents requiring a concerted response. 
There is no need to displace these systems or the 
day-to-day performance monitoring and improvement 
which they facilitate. However, it is important to apply 
the principles of best practice to these systems in 
order to facilitate reporting. These could include using 
human-centred design to create user-friendly reporting 
interfaces and specific feedback mechanisms. It could 
also include a new functionality to allow patient safety 
managers to review incident reports more constructively. 
For instance, the introduction of dashboards that present 
incident information and allow the user to filter incidents 
on key characteristics like time, ward, classification and 
level of harm would facilitate easier, more effective use 
of the data. Ideally, dashboards would also be enabled 
to link incidents at the patient level for a more granular 
understanding of what is occurring along the patient 
pathway, or link event types at the NHS trust level to 
investigate what areas present the biggest cause for 
concern organisationally. Ultimately, while the goals of 
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local systems do not need to change, the procedures 
they require from staff should be updated to reflect new 
findings about what works best to engender a culture 
of reporting. 
Next generation technology and usability
We conclude that while technology has moved on 
significantly since the inception of the NRLS, the systems 
remain firmly rooted in the constraints of the past. There 
is significant scope to adopt cloud-based, multi-plat-
form, flexible and scalable data infrastructure, which 
places a new emphasis on sharing, speed, and analysis 
rather than collection and storage.
The first step to utilising these technologies more 
effectively is establishing a better understanding of how 
digitally mature the systems already are, and what their 
prospects are for interoperability with other records 
systems. In other words, it is important to make sure we 
know how the current NRLS can communicate with other 
systems and how adaptable they are to new software and 
technology. Following a review of digital capabilities of 
these systems, it will be clearer where work needs to be 
done to integrate more advanced technological systems 
into the existing incident reporting infrastructure. 
In future incident reporting systems, it will be impor-
tant to use digital resources which are now very familiar 
to staff. For instance, smartphone technology could 
enable staff to report in near real-time via a device they 
are accustomed to using, and a more advanced back 
end could allow this information to be stored in a cloud 
based system. 
Furthermore, it will be important to employ behav-
ioural insights from user-centred design so that new 
systems are built with the aim of limiting staff burden 
and reducing human error. Considering the pervasive low 
reporting problem associated with the NRLS, designing a 
system that invites staff to use it is paramount. Examples 
of this include making sure reporting interfaces are 
visually pleasing, that the amount of text and question 
fields are not daunting and that colours match heuristic 
interpretations of what certain colours indicate (i.e. 
using green buttons to move forward and red to stop).
Leveraging these developments will help modernise 
the NRLS and mobilise a stronger engagement with the 
reporting process.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DEMONSTRATING 
FEASIBILITY 
THROUGH 
PROTOTYPING
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CareReport – a demonstrator system 
We took the combined findings from this research and 
applied them in a practical way to devise a prototype in-
cident reporting system provisionally called CareReport. 
We synthesised a single system that accounts for the 
insights from the four domains of research.
Purpose of the demonstrator
The primary goal of a reporting system is to facilitate the 
collection of details pertaining to all incidents and harm 
due to care. As secondary goals, the system aims to 
render useful, accessible data to promote accountability, 
learning and improvement; crucially, however, it does 
not attempt to be directly responsible for these aspects. 
These goals provide clarity to what the reporting 
system should be. The demonstrator system, therefore, 
is a platform for collecting and storing staff reports 
about patient safety incidents, including a feedback loop 
between reporters and risk managers. This enables the 
counting, tracking and investigation of incidents, and 
can provide data for separate learning and improvement 
systems. Finally, given constrained budgets in nearly 
all health systems, the demonstrator is frugal and 
adaptable to almost any environment regardless of the 
existing digital infrastructure. 
User experience with the demonstrator
The primary barriers to the success of the current NRLS 
revolve around staff finding the system difficult to 
use and time consuming. In the demonstrator system 
we have sought to rectify this situation by designing 
a reporting platform that reflects the facilitators to 
incident reporting. 
Our research suggested the importance of reporting 
systems being quick, easy to use and clear. In order to 
maximise these areas, our demonstrator system works 
online but has also been designed to operate as an app 
for smartphones or tablets capable of offline reporting. 
The ability to work across devices means the system is 
adaptable and will not buckle under changing technology 
or become obsolete. Not only does this allow staff to 
report using their preferred device, it presents a frugal 
option for health systems in which services or individual 
staff members might have compatible mobile phones, 
but the system does not have the financial capacity for 
an advanced computing system. 
Additionally, the demonstrator requires a significantly 
reduced number of fields for reporters to complete. The 
simpler format is designed to change staff perception of 
incident reporting as a long and cumbersome process, 
to a simple task that can be accomplished right after 
the incident. 
This change of attitude, however, requires more than 
a simplified app-based platform. The demonstrator 
uses behavioural insights as discussed earlier to design 
an intuitive interface that limits scope for human error 
and confusion. For instance the questions about what 
happened during the incident progress from incident 
category, to what contributed to the incident, to the level 
of harm and finally into the date and specifics of the 
incident. Small things like the date being presented in a 
scroll down menu rather than in free text boxes makes 
reporting quicker, and maintains a level of consistency 
around how things are reported. Finally, there is a free 
text box included so that reporters can elaborate on the 
details of the event in case the questions did not capture 
everything they wanted to report. 
EXHIBIT 3: Care Report demonstrator system app
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Ensuring data quality focused on two 
key considerations: the use of free 
text comments about incidents and 
the taxonomy reporters are given to 
classify incidents
Data quality and analysis from the demonstrator 
After being certain that the demonstrator used evidence 
to improve uptake and engender wider use, we began to 
tackle the quality of the data it could actually capture. 
Ensuring data quality focused on two key considerations: 
the use of free text comments about incidents and the 
taxonomy reporters are given to classify incidents. 
Using natural language processing and machine 
learning we are able to automatically classify events 
using key word pairs from small subsets of already 
classified events. We can use this technique to 
auto-classify events according to a defined taxonomy 
with small subsets of manually classified events as a 
basis. Natural language processing can also be used 
for auto-generation of headlines and for automatically 
tagging key words in incident descriptions.
Effective feedback for learning from the demonstrator 
Finally, the demonstrator places a significant emphasis 
on establishing a feedback loop between reporters and 
the staff who manage and respond to incident reports. 
For instance on the app platform, when a reporter 
submits an incident report, it automatically generates 
a notification to the designated manager. The manager 
then has options for how to respond to or follow up with 
the event. The actions the risk manager takes are then 
relayed to the initial reporter. The reporter can also 
check up on the status of their report so they are clear 
what has been done after submission and the process 
and progress of the submitted information.
The demonstrator also provides a dashboard feature, 
meaning the data is automatically fed into an analysis 
system, which can produce easy-to-understand graphs 
and charts visually depicting the volume and nature of 
incidents. This helps reporters see how their reports 
contribute to organisational monitoring and offers a 
helpful resource to learning systems. 
Conclusion
The pillars of the demonstrator system are evidence 
based and forward thinking to enable an effective 
and modern reporting system. It offers an enhanced 
design for a reporting system with a specific focus on 
driving national monitoring as well as local learning. 
It is intended to preserve detailed local reporting and 
capture incident specifics to inform individual provid-
ers’ improvement strategies. It offers risk management 
teams customisable incident dashboards so they can 
easily visualise the information staff are reporting. It 
also introduces a new way of feeding this information 
into a national reporting and learning system. The 
learning from local safety initiatives, specifically 
the processes which have demonstrated success in 
reducing harm, will be directed to a national shared 
learning platform. This promotes a system of enhanced 
reporting at the local level and sharing solutions rather 
than problems at the national level.
EXHIBIT 4: Care Report demonstrator system dashboard 
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CHAPTER FIVE
ASSESSING 
USAGE AND 
IMPACT 
THROUGH 
EVALUATION
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The research from the four domains has culminated in 
the demonstrator system, but we also recognise the 
need to establish a standard evaluation procedure to 
monitor the success of systems like it in the future. An 
evaluation framework has been created based on the 
principles of best practice in incident reporting, and 
it aims to provide a standard method for monitoring 
and evaluation that ensures future systems can be 
benchmarked against the evidence we collected during 
this research. 
The evaluation framework includes five strands: 
readiness and resources, uptake and usage, capturing 
relevant information, analysis and publication, gener-
ating learning and improvement. These five areas are 
considered levels of maturity because they will apply 
to certain systems and not others depending on how 
established or advanced a reporting system is. For in-
stance a system that is in its embryonic stage will have a 
different set of considerations for success than one that 
has been around for decades. Monitoring success based 
on maturity levels helps ensure that the system develops 
appropriately, rather than in a rush to the highest levels 
of maturity. A recently implemented system will need to 
look closely at resource and readiness measures to make 
sure the functioning of the system is possible given the 
financial and staff resources available. 
Once systems have passed resource and readiness 
evaluations, uptake and usage measures can be used to 
evaluate how well a reporting system is able to overcome 
the barriers discovered in the user experience research. 
These measures can also help identify which groups 
of staff are using it most often and where there seems 
to be lags in uptake. Following from uptake and usage, 
the system needs to be evaluated on the quality of the 
information it captures. Especially as new systems will 
attempt to reduce reporting time, it will be necessary 
to ensure that changes do not result in compromised 
data quality. Furthermore, it is necessary for the data 
to be accessible to those who need to use it for quality 
improvement. Once assurances have been made for 
adequate data quality, the final level of evaluation, and 
highest level of maturity, is its ability to generate impact. 
This does not necessarily mean assessing the system for 
whether or not it has produced quantifiable differences 
in safety, but whether the data it produces is clear and 
useful for quality improvement managers. If the reports 
are inaccessible – in terms of location or content – the 
system is less likely to deliver impact. 
EXHIBIT 5: Incident reporting system evaluation framework
MATURITY GROUP INDICATOR
• Appropriate financial and staff 
resources
• Designed based on user-needs
• Objectives clearly articulated
• Established culture around safety 
• Training for staff
• Clear definitions of what should 
be reported
• Anonymous 
• Direct feedback loop from 
manager to reporter
• Web-based 
• Simple reporting platforms
• Reports reflect the actual number 
of incident reports 
• Reports are made in a timely 
manner
• Collaborative reporting to ensure 
data supports action
• Data is analysable
• Data is understood by staff 
responsible for acting on it
• Managers have immediate 
access to data
• All staff are involved in analysis
• Prioritisation of efforts prior to 
designing improvements
• Established system for 
monitoring improvements
• Innovative approaches to 
engaging staff in improvement
1. 
RESOURCES & 
READINESS
3. 
INFORMATION 
CAPTURE
2. 
UPTAKE & 
USAGE
4. 
ANALYSIS & 
PUBLICATION
5. 
GENERATING 
LEARNING & 
IMPROVEMENT
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SUMMARY LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NHS IMPROVEMENT
Achievement Toolkit
Following our research, we conclude with a series of 
recommendations for next steps regarding the NRLS. The 
recommendations can be considered an ‘Achievement 
Toolkit’, as they are derived from the evidence about 
what makes the most effective reporting system. 
Recommendation 1: Achieve clarity of purpose for distinct 
local and national systems, specifically a national system that 
will provide the necessary quantifiable monitoring data on a 
mandatory basis
Recommendation 2: Specify a limited number of incidents which 
will be collected nationally and collect structured and free text 
data about them through a web portal
Recommendation 3: Make the collected national data available 
to NHS Trusts to compare performance, and set ambitious 
targets for reducing quantifiable harm
Recommendation 4: Maintain existing local risk management 
systems, and empower local service improvement efforts by 
using Patient Safety Collaboratives to share solutions and 
advancements 
Recommendation 5: Conduct routine analysis on future data, 
and apply novel/cutting-edge data-mining technologies to the 
existing reservoir of data so it can be used by the Royal Colleges 
to answer clinical questions 
Recommendation 6: Apply the principles of user-focused 
design to all new tools, incorporating elements of our prototype 
systems as applicable
Recommendation 7: Undertake an extensive communication and 
education campaign to re-centre staff on the importance, role, 
and impact of incident reporting
Recommendation 8: Articulate the potential benefits and track 
progress against usage and impact targets using the framework 
we have suggested
Recommendation 9: Begin to nationally track patient safety 
incidents in certain priority areas like primary care, mental 
health and community care where there is an unmet need for 
enhanced patient safety using comparable methodology
Recommendation 10: Look to international best practice and 
benchmarks to understand how other countries approach 
patient safety information systems and share the new 
approach globally
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